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Collaborative Pipeline Risk Governance: 
A Response to Professor Gosman 
TARA RIGHETTI* 
In her article, Planning for Failure: Pipelines, Risk, and the Energy 
Revolution, Professor Sara Gosman undertakes a comprehensive and insightful 
study of the risk governance associated with pipeline siting.1 Gosman focuses 
on the separation of legal frameworks governing safety and those governing 
siting.2 She argues that parallel risk governance paradigms are insufficient to 
address the risk of catastrophic harm posed by the ongoing massive energy 
infrastructure buildout associated with the energy revolution.3 
Domestic natural gas and oil pipeline infrastructure has expanded rapidly to 
connect new production resources with markets and export terminals.4 As 
Gosman documents, hundreds of thousands of miles of oil pipelines and 
millions of miles of gas pipelines transect the United States, running under 
roads, rivers, and through subdivisions.5 In addition, gathering lines connect 
wells within remote production fields and transport product to market 
transmission systems for long-distance transportation.6 As domestic oil and gas 
production have increased owing to hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling, 
so has the need for transportation.7 Gosman illustrates the pipeline system is 
rapidly “remaking itself” into a more widespread system of higher pressure and 
larger diameter pipelines.8 While she acknowledges that pipelines are still the 
safest option for transportation of oil and natural gas, she suggests that domestic 
pipeline transmission has outgrown its supervisory and regulatory structures 
with respect to safety.9 
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 1 See generally Sarah Gosman, Planning for Failure: Pipelines, Risk, and the Energy 
Revolution, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 349 (2020).  
 2 See id. at 355–56. 
 3 See id. at 394–97. 
 4 Id. at 354. 
 5 Id. at 356–57. 
 6 “Gathering line means a pipeline that transports gas from a current production facility 
to a transmission line or main.” 49 C.F.R. § 192.3 (2019); see also 49 C.F.R. § 195.2 (2019) 
(defining a gathering line to mean “a pipeline 219.1 mm (8 5/8 in) or less nominal outside 
diameter that transports petroleum from a production facility”). 
 7 Gosman, supra note 1, at 364. 
 8 Id. at 367. 
 9 See id. at 394–97. 
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Gosman’s principal critique of pipeline risk governance is that safety and 
siting regulation are needlessly divided, and thus do not adequately address the 
interrelationship between a pipeline’s location and the risk of a spill or failure.10 
The regulatory structure for siting pipeline infrastructure varies significantly 
between interstate natural gas pipelines, interstate oil pipelines, intrastate 
pipelines for both gas and oil, and gathering lines.11 In contrast to the federal 
siting framework for interstate natural gas pipelines, interstate oil pipelines and 
intrastate pipelines for both oil and gas must obtain state regulatory approval 
and eminent domain authority.12 As Gosman correctly identifies, there are 
significant variations between federal and state approaches.13 However, she 
identifies one commonality: administrative reviews of pipeline siting are largely 
inadequate with respect to safety and thus do not adequately account for the 
long-term risk of the pipeline.14  
Safety, on the other hand, is federally regulated by the Pipeline and 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA).15 PHMSA regulates 
safety throughout the lifecycle of the pipeline: design, construction, operation, 
maintenance, and abandonment.16 Although PHMSA standards discourage 
locating rights-of-ways in areas containing “private dwellings, industrial 
 
 10 Id. at 370. 
 11 See id. at 377–82; Alexandra B. Klass, Future-Proofing Energy Transport Law, 94 
WASH. U. L. REV. 827, 837, 843 (2017).  
 12 Pursuant to Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) determines whether the siting of proposed natural gas pipelines meets 
the “public convenience and necessity.” 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c)(1)(A) (2020); see also Gosman, 
supra note 1, at 352 n.22; Klass, supra note 11, at 843. In comparison, oil and intrastate gas 
pipelines either go largely unregulated or they primarily undergo siting at the state level. 
Gosman, supra note 1, at 380–81 (citing ALASKA STAT. §§ 42.06.240(a), .630 (2018); ARK. 
CODE ANN. §§ 23-18-503(6)(C), -510(a) (2015); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 1001, 1002.5 
(West 2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 16-50i, 50k (2013); FLA. STAT. § 403.9405 (2015); 220 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-401 (2013); IOWA CODE ANN. § 479.5 (West 2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 164, §§ 69G, 69J (2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 483.109 (West 2008); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 216G.02 (West 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-20-104(9)(b), -201 (2019); NEV. 
REV. STAT. §§ 704.860, .865 (2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 162-H:2(VII)(a), :5(I), :10-b 
(2014); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW §§ 120(2), 121 (McKinney 2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-22.1-
01(7)(a), -04 (2014); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4906.01(B)(1)(c), .04 (West. Supp. 2019); 
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 469.300(11)(a)(E)(ii), 320 (2017); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-98-3, -4 (2006); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 49-41B2.1(2), -4 (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 248(a)(3) (2017); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 56-265.2–.2:1 (2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 80.50.020(21)(b), .060 
(West 2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-1-101(a)(vi)(G), -2-205 (2019)).  
 13 See Gosman, supra note 1, at 377–82. 
 14 See id. at 394–97. Some state siting approaches may actually compound risks by co-
locating pipelines within a consolidated corridor. See, e.g., BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., DEP’T 
OF THE INTERIOR, SCOPING SUMMARY REPORT: WYOMING PIPELINE CORRIDOR INITIATIVE 
PROJECT DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 11 (2020). While a pipeline corridor 
might streamline siting processes and acquisition of right of way, it could increase the risk 
of multiple and concurrent failures resulting from seismic or other localized events.  
 15 49 U.S.C. § 108 (2012). 
 16 Gosman, supra note 1, at 373 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 60102(a)(2)(B) (2012)). 
2020] OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE 65 
 
buildings, and places of public assembly,”17 they do not prescribe a route or 
location or evaluate alternatives based on consequences of an accident.18 
Further, safety standards only modestly protect “high consequence areas” 
through additional regulation, the imposition of additional construction and 
operation specifications, and integrity management requirements.19 Thus, 
federal control through both FERC and PHMSA fails to fully encompass the 
nuanced and ever-changing landscape of risk. As Gosman’s article illustrates, 
the current system allows pipelines to be sited near people and sensitive 
ecological and cultural resources even where the consequences of failure could 
be catastrophic.20  
Gosman’s typology classifies risk policies as either preventative, 
managerial, or remedial according to when the policy would intercede in the risk 
timeline.21 She argues that the current, bifurcated approach to safety and siting 
is primarily managerial and remedial.22 Safety regulations are designed to 
uniformly reduce risk to acceptable levels.23 However, Gosman argues that by 
considering safety as emmeshed with pipeline placement and geography, some 
of the most devastating human and environmental tragedies can be avoided.24 
Thus, she argues that a preventative approach would be safer, more efficient, 
and publicly acceptable.25 Gosman’s preventative approach does not advocate 
for a moratorium on pipeline construction. She acknowledges that, while 
pipeline operators have some latitude in siting long distance projects, at times 
pipelines cannot be rerouted and that, so long as we rely on natural gas, an 
absolute preventative approach that would prohibit all pipelines is infeasible.26 
Rather, Gosman advocates for meaningfully integrating safety analyses into 
federal siting processes for both interstate oil and natural gas pipelines.27 She 
suggests a more integrated federal framework that combines siting and safety in 
 
 17 49 C.F.R. § 195.210(a) (2019). 
 18 Since Gosman’s article was written, PHMSA issued a new “mega rule” which 
addresses some of the regulatory gaps Gosman identifies, including gaps in regulating 
gathering lines. The changes to the safety-related condition reporting requirement may help 
inform PHMSA about risk. The rule will go into effect July 1, 2020. Pipeline Safety: Safety 
of Gas Transmission Pipelines: MAOP Reconfirmation, Expansion of Assessment 
Requirements, and Other Related Amendments, 84 Fed. Reg. 52,180, 52,231 (Oct. 1, 2019) 
(to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 191–92); Pipeline Safety: Safety of Hazardous Liquid 
Pipelines, 84 Fed. Reg. 52,260, 52,294 (Oct. 1, 2019) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R pt. 195). 
 19 See 49 C.F.R. § 192 (2019). 
 20 Gosman, supra note 1, at 374–75. 
 21 Id. at 388. 
 22 Id. at 390–91. 
 23 Id. at 391. 
 24 Id. at 400. 
 25 Id.   
 26 See Gosman, supra note 1, at 393–94. 
 27 Id. at 400. 
66 A RESPONSE TO GOSMAN [Vol. 81  
a single agency would encourage siting decisions that avoid high consequence 
areas.28 
While increasing safety considerations regarding long term risk, 
consolidation in federal agencies may eclipse state and local safety concerns and 
further diminish participation by local governments. As Gosman notes, 
consolidation of siting and safety into one federal agency would transfer oil 
pipeline siting authority away from states, likely garnering political 
opposition.29 Although Gosman acknowledges that risk governance could be 
improved through greater involvement of landowners, local governments, 
municipalities, and other political or administrative subdivisions, she critiques 
that a localized siting approach would increase transaction and information costs 
and shift the burden of risk governance to communities and landowners.30 As 
Gosman and others have noted, there are significant barriers to meaningful local 
government involvement in federal pipeline siting processes, despite statutory 
consultation requirements.31 Further, examples from oil pipelines and 
transmission lines indicate that local opposition in state processes may derail 
construction of necessary interstate infrastructure.32 A shift in siting authority 
to local governments, she argues, could prevent public goods from being 
constructed and might not increase safety: local governments and landowners 
might not have accurate information or be able to efficiently assess risk.33  
This Response considers whether coordinated and inclusive governance of 
pipeline siting would improve safety by facilitating bargaining around localized 
pipeline externalities. It focuses on the role of local governments, landowners, 
and other political and administrative subdivisions in pipeline risk governance. 
In other contexts, local governments and landowners have made significant 
contributions to environmental governance of large, landscape-scale resources 
through private agreements and public-private partnerships.34 These 
arrangements provide both nimbleness and dynamism to environmental 
governance over fragmented resources and avoid inefficient externalities.35 
They also facilitate trust and cooperation among participants and may give rise 
to implied obligations of good faith between them.36 Why not here? This 
Response argues that negotiations and resulting contracts with landowners and 
 
 28 Id.  
 29 Id. at 400–01. 
 30 Id. 
 31 See, e.g., id. at 395. 
 32 See Gosman, supra note 1, at 351–52; Klass, supra note 11, at 854. For a 
comprehensive review of efforts to reroute the nexus-spectrum pipeline, see Heidi Gorovitz 
Robertson, Cities and Citizens Seethe: A Case Study of Local Efforts to Influence Natural 
Gas Pipeline Routing Decisions, (forthcoming) (manuscript at 124–32) [on file with author].  
 33 Gosman, supra note 1, at 395. 
 34 See, e.g., Karen Bradshaw Schulz & Dean Lueck, Contracting for Control of 
Landscape-Level Resources, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2507, 2530–31 (2015). 
 35 Hannah J. Wiseman, Coordinating the Oil and Gas Commons, 6 BYU L. REV. 1543, 
1552–53 (2014). 
 36 Denbury Onshore LLC v. Christensen, 722 F. App’x 768, 775 (10th Cir. 2018). 
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local governments surrounding pipeline siting processes can supplement public 
governance structures, increasing the safety and environmental sustainability of 
interstate infrastructure projects. It suggests that pipelines already are areas of 
shared public-private control, and that, as a result, pipeline safety governance 
should facilitate more robust collaboration and private ordering. Part I of this 
Response frames pipeline siting within the literature of landscape-scale resource 
planning and private environmental governance. Part II analyzes current 
opportunities for local government and landowner participation in federal 
natural gas siting processes through FERC, with a particular emphasis on safety 
and rerouting. Part III offers observations regarding how federal regulatory 
processes for pipeline siting could create space for more meaningful and 
substantive consultation and involvement by landowners and local governments 
and offers suggestions relative to solving information and transaction cost 
problems.  
I. THE PIPELINE AS A LANDSCAPE-SCALE RESOURCE 
Recent scholarship in natural resource and environmental law has focused 
on assembling and governing landscape-scale resources.37 Landscape-scale 
resources are those that “exceed individual parcel sizes”38 and thus “cannot be 
constrained into neatly defined lines.”39 Examples of landscape-scale resources 
include firescapes, oil and gas reservoirs, wildlife migration corridors, 
recreation and viewscapes, night skies, and ecosystems.40 Landscape-scale 
resources defy confinement to individual parcels of land and can only be used 
and enjoyed at a landscape scale.41 
At first, pipelines seem an awkward fit with the concept of landscape 
resources: pipelines are exactly that—a neatly defined line—the type of “‘long 
and skinny’ public-good producing resources” that are well suited to centralized 
and unilateral government control.42 As demonstrated by siting disputes 
concerning transmission lines and oil pipelines, overlapping local and state 
 
 37 Bradshaw & Lueck, supra note 34, at 2516; Karen Bradshaw & Bryan 
Leonard, Virtual Parceling, INT’L J. COMMONS (forthcoming) (manuscript at 3–4) [on file 
with author]; Allison Jones, The Importance of Connected and Conserved Landscapes in a 
Time of Changing Climate, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 135, 144–46 (2011); Bryan Leonard & 
Dominic Parker, Creating Anticommons: Historical Land Privatization and Modern Natural 
Resource Use, ECON. J. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 40) [on file with author]; Tara Righetti, 
Contracting for Sustainable Surface Management, 71 ARK. L. REV. 367, 368 (2018) 
[hereinafter Righetti, Contracting]. 
 38 Bradshaw & Lueck, supra note 34, at 2507. 
 39 Id. at 2511. 
 40 See id. at 2524–47 (citing a wide range of examples of landscape-scale resources).  
41 See id. at 2516. 
 42 Id. at 2519. 
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siting of energy transmission resources can produce inefficiencies43 and prevent 
the construction of needed public good projects.44 As a result, much of recent 
scholarship has advocated for more centralized control of energy transmission 
projects, either through federal backstop authority or governance that can be 
scaled to the interstate nature of the proposed project.45 Fully localized siting 
authority could produce a patchwork of regulations and procedures based on 
heterogeneous preferences throughout the entire length of the pipeline, thus 
increasing transaction costs and further diluting comprehensive analysis of long-
term and distributed safety risk.46  
In other key respects oil and natural gas pipelines are the ultimate landscape-
scale resource. They form a circulatory system that drapes the country, 
connecting remote production resources in rural Wyoming with chemical plants 
in Houston and subdivisions in Maine.47 Like wildlife migration routes, a 
resilient pipeline network requires interconnectivity and coordination. In 
contrast to the diversity of uses and preferences along the entire route of an 
interstate pipeline, pipeline segments are likely to transect areas of greater 
homogeneity.48 Land along a pipeline route is already divided into political and 
administrative subdivisions such as fire districts, conservation and water 
districts, local governments, and counties.49 Shared geographical proximity may 
align landowner interests, making it easier to assemble resources and advocate 
for landowner preferences.50 These conditions reduce transaction costs between 
landowners and provide opportunities for collaborative action—either in favor 
or opposition of projects.51 
Owing to the vast heterogeneity of land uses along a pipeline route, it is not 
difficult to imagine that uniform safety and siting regulations discount regional 
concerns, overlook low probability events, and fail to incorporate local 
knowledge and preferences.52 As indicated by the highly publicized disputes 
 
 43 See Leonard & Parker, supra note 38 (manuscript at 37–38) (illustrating that in the 
tribal trust system, subdivision of control can reduce rents realized from oil and gas 
development). 
 44 Klass, supra note 11, at 876. 
 45 See id. at 873–74, 875–77; Tara K. Righetti, Siting Carbon Dioxide Pipelines, 3 OIL 
& GAS NAT. RESOURCE & ENERGY J. 907, 909 (2017). 
 46 Bradshaw & Lueck, supra note 34, at 2544–45. 
 47 See Gosman, supra note 1, at 356 (describing the vast reach of pipelines throughout 
the United States). 
 48 See Bradshaw & Leonard, supra note 35, at 3 (describing and applying Bradshaw 
and Lueck’s prior work in the pipeline context).  
 49 See Gosman, supra note 1, at 351. 
 50 Bradshaw & Lueck, supra note 34, at 2516 (“Shared geographical proximity of many 
resource users allows for consolidation of efforts to defend against laws restricting resource 
use and lobbying government for favorable policies.”); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in 
Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1320 (1993).  
 51 Ellickson, supra note 50, at 1397–98. 
 52 Klass, supra note 11, at 837–38. 
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over the Keystone XL, Dakota Access, and Nexus-Spectra pipelines,53 local 
government, tribal, and landowner opposition to pipeline construction has 
increased.54 Concerns over siting, safety, climate, and environmental impacts, 
as well as frustrations relative to lack of power and substantive consultation 
have eroded the social license afforded to energy transportation projects.55 
The importance of pipeline safety and risk governance to local governments 
and administrative subdivisions and the landowners within them should not be 
overlooked. Despite federal siting frameworks and broad condemnation 
authority, once constructed, pipelines become areas of public-private control.56 
Landowners already have a significant role in pipeline risk management.57 As 
Gosman notes, the leading cause of accidents in gas distribution pipelines is 
excavation damage, whether through construction, plowing, or digging.58 
Easement and right-of-way agreements may require landowners to indemnify 
pipeline operators from damages resulting from landowner-caused failures.59 
Landowners also bargain for compensation, minor routing changes, and surface 
management conditions.60 Thus, landowners not only have the most intimate 
understanding of the land on which pipelines are constructed, but they are also 
among the principal contributors to gas distribution pipeline failures. Regardless 
of the cause, landowners bear many of the most immediate harms of pipeline 
failures.61 Additionally, landowners use of property overlying pipelines will be 
influenced by local regulations and norms.62 As a result, private governance 
instruments and local regulations have the potential to significantly influence 
pipeline safety. 
Private-public contracts can fill gaps in current federal and state siting 
processes, addressing localized concerns and reducing public opposition 
through contracts, community benefit agreements, memoranda of 
understanding, and other mechanisms. Lueck and Bradshaw argue that private 
governance mechanisms are best suited to areas where homogeneity among 
landowner incentives and regular transacting between landowners reduce costs 
 
 53 Robertson, supra note 33 (manuscript at 126–43). 
 54 Klass, supra note 11, at 837–38; see James W. Coleman, Beyond the Pipeline Wars: 
Reforming Environmental Assessment of Energy Transport Infrastructure, 2018 UTAH L. 
REV. 119, 122 (2018); Gosman, supra note 1, at 351–52; Sam Kalen, A Bridge to Nowhere?: 
Our Energy Transition and the Natural Gas Pipeline Wars, MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 3, 28) [on file with author].  
 55 See Kristen van de Biezenbos, Negotiating Energy Democracy, 33 J. LAND USE & 
ENVTL. L. 331, 334–35 (2018). 
 56 See generally Bradshaw & Lueck, supra note 34 (describing the public-private 
control dynamics that arise after infrastructure that cannot be contained to one piece of 
property is constructed). 
 57 Gosman, supra note 1, at 395. 
 58 Id. at 371. 
 59 See Righetti, Contracting, supra note 38, at 368. 
 60 Id. at 368, 375. 
 61 See, e.g., Gosman, supra note 1, at 370–71. 
 62 PIPELINE SAFETY TR., LANDOWNER’S GUIDE TO PIPELINES 7 (3d ed. 2016). 
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of bargaining.63 They further suggest that formality and public resources can 
overcome barriers to transacting as the number of coordinating parties 
increase.64 While coordination problems along the entire route of a pipeline may 
be significant, thus supporting uniform federal safety and siting,65 regional 
homogeneity of land uses and interests may resolve contracting problems.66 A 
cooperative federalism approach that combines federal siting authority with 
meaningful opportunities for landowner and local government participation 
through both siting proceedings and contracting would improve pipeline risk 
governance. 
II. LIMITS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND LANDOWNER INVOLVEMENT 
Local regulation of pipeline siting, safety, and environmental impacts are 
largely preempted by state and federal law.67 Local governments can regulate 
traditional land use functions such as building codes,68 though local efforts to 
use zoning or other local control mechanisms to prohibit or reroute pipelines 
have been largely unsuccessful.69 Accordingly, a local governments most 
meaningful opportunity to influence siting may be through intervention in 
federal siting processes.  
The current federal siting process provides several avenues for local 
government and landowner participation. The Natural Gas Act grants FERC 
authority over all transportation and sale of natural gas impacting interstate 
commerce.70 The Natural Gas Act requires that persons and companies engaged 
in the transportation and sale of natural gas acquire a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity from FERC before engaging in the proposed 
construction or extension of facilities used for transporting or sale of gas.71 
Filing processes with FERC provide local governments and landowners with 
formal avenues to participate in a voluntary, consultative, pre-filing process 
through the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).72 This process 
 
 63 Bradshaw & Lueck, supra note 34, at 2530–31. 
 64 Id. at 2539. 
 65 See id. 
 66 See, e.g., id. at 2530–31. 
 67 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–58, § 311, 119 Stat. 594, 687–88; 
Gosman, supra note 1, at 377–78.  
 68 See PIPELINE SAFETY TR., supra note 63, at 7. 
 69 Robertson, supra note 33 (manuscript at 101–02); EIS Pre-Filing Environmental 
Review Process, FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSION, https://www.ferc.gov/resources/ 
processes/flow/process-eis.asp [https://perma.cc/GB97-XSEX] [hereinafter EIS Pre-
Filing]. 
 70 Natural Gas Act § 7(c)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c)(1)(A) (2018).  
 71 See id. 
 72 FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, GUIDANCE MANUAL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
REPORT PREPARATION 3-1 to 3-4 (2017), https://www.ferc.gov/industries/gas/enviro/ 
guidelines/guidance-manual-volume-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/88NG-QKCZ] [hereinafter 
GUIDANCE MANUAL]. 
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provides stakeholders—including landowners and local governments—with 
early notice of proposed pipeline projects.73 The prefiling process also offers 
stakeholders opportunities to participate early in the pipeline process in order to 
raise concerns prospectively and influence the project’s location and design.74 
During the preliminary and scoping processes, landowners and local 
governments can attend open houses, scoping meetings, and site visits.75  
Additionally, landowners, local governments, and other regional 
administrative bodies have an opportunity to provide formal comments as part 
of the NEPA review process.76 NEPA’s implementing of regulations for the 
Natural Gas Act requires the applicant to consult with federal, state, and local 
agencies during scoping and environmental review processes.77 This includes 
preparation of a report that describes “the impact the project will have on present 
uses of the affected area . . . , including commercial uses, mineral resources, 
recreational areas, public health and safety, and the aesthetic value of the 
land.”78 Other statutes, such as the National Historic Preservation Act, may also 
affect interstate pipeline siting and provide opportunities for local government 
consultation.79  
For many communities, formal consultation procedures have not resulted in 
substantive opportunities to significantly influence pipeline siting or safety.80 
Although NEPA and other environmental review statutes require federal 
agencies to consider local concerns and the risk of pipeline failures during the 
siting process,81 presently these processes do not assure that the environmental, 
safety, and local concerns of energy transportation infrastructure are thoroughly 
vetted. Poor coordination between FERC and PHMSA, inattention, and reliance 
on PHMSA rules to mitigate risk may leave important safety risks 
unaddressed.82 Many landowners and local governments, additionally, face 
numerous hurdles to effective participation in formal siting procedures 
including lack of effective communication, transparency, and lack of power.83 
Moreover, poor coordination between FERC and PHMSA, inattention, and 
reliance on PHMSA rules to mitigate risk may leave important safety risks 
unaddressed.84 
 
 73 Robertson, supra note 33 (manuscript at 104) (citing Frequently Asked Questions 
(FAQs): Gas Pre-Filing, FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSION, https://www.ferc.gov/resources/ 
faqs/prefiling.asp [https://perma.cc/U5D7-36AD] (last updated May 30, 2012)). 
 74 18 C.F.R. § 157.21 (2019).  
 75 EIS Pre-Filing, supra note 70. 
 76 See GUIDANCE MANUAL, supra note 73, at 2-1 to 2-6. 
 77 18 C.F.R. § 380.3(b)(3) (2019). 
 78 18 C.F.R. § 380.12(j)(8) (emphasis added). 
 79 36 U.S.C. § 800.3(f)(1) (2018). 
 80 See Gosman, supra note 1, at 395. 
 81 See supra notes 72–78 and accompanying text. 
 82 Gosman, supra note 1, at 373–75; Kalen, supra note 54 (manuscript at 49, 61–62).  
 83 Robertson, supra note 33 (manuscript at 121). 
 84 Gosman, supra note 1, at 373–75; Kalen, supra note 54 (manuscript at 49, 61–62).  
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Communities that can overcome barriers to consultation may realize 
substantial benefits. Although not required as part of the consultation process, 
active involvement by cities or counties can result in the execution of private 
governance agreements. The concerted and coordinated efforts of Ohio 
residents and communities around the siting of the Nexus-Spectra pipeline 
resulted in a settlement that addressed many of the communities’ concerns.85 
Residents of Green, Oberlin, and Bowling Green had significant apprehension 
regarding the impact and risks of the proposed pipeline as a result of fault lines, 
school zones, water sources and environmental areas.86 Residents relentlessly 
participated in formal consultation processes including open houses and scoping 
meetings, commenting in NEPA and CWA environmental review processes, 
city council meetings, referenda, protests, and charter amendments.87 It was 
only after challenging FERC’s certificate of approval and filing a class action 
lawsuit against Nexus and FERC that the City of Green entered into a settlement 
regarding the pipeline, which included public service improvements, monitoring 
obligations, and local exactions in exchange for the dismissal of all lawsuits.88 
Notably, the city was able to obtain some minor rerouting concessions, all of 
them related to safety hazards that were identified by the community.89 This 
experience demonstrates the challenges that confront citizens and local 
governments intervening in the FERC process. It also hints at the potential of 
private governance instruments to obtain community benefits for locally sited 
energy transportation projects, decrease local opposition, and encourage siting 
away from locally identified safety hazards. Thus, private governance 
agreements regarding pipeline siting can fill an important role in a preventative 
risk-governance approach consistent with Gosman’s goals. 
III. COLLABORATIVE PIPELINE RISK GOVERNANCE 
Formal consultation procedures supported by public resources and 
information encourage private contracting around environmental problems.90 
However, despite consultation requirements and easement negotiations with 
landowners, including local governments, development agreements for pipeline 
siting are uncommon. Many communities confront significant difficulties 
intervening in federal siting processes.91 Although easements and rights-of-way 
 
 85 Emily Chesnic, Green Approves NEXUS Settlement, AKRON.COM (Feb. 8, 2018), 
https://www.akron.com/articles/green-approves-nexus-settlement/ [https://perma.cc/Q5B8-
6HZS]. 
 86 Robertson, supra note 33 (manuscript at 124). 
 87 Id. (manuscript at 126–32). 
 88 Id. (manuscript at 146–47). 
 89 Id. (manuscript at 147–49). 
 90 Kalen, supra note 54 (manuscript at 34–37).  
 91 Id. at 50 n.250. FERC currently operates under a stringent policy against late 
intervention efforts by landowners and efforts to bring in issues that landowners failed to 
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negotiations occur, these are frequently conducted against background threats 
of condemnation and may be hampered by informational and organizational 
problems and differential bargaining power.92 Additionally, these negotiations 
may occur after the route has been approved, thus limiting opportunities to 
address local safety and siting concerns. Thus, many of the potential benefits of 
private environmental governance relative to pipeline siting may not be realized. 
Siting and safety agencies—whether FERC or the expanded PHMSA for which 
Gosman advocates93—can remediate the informational, organizational, and 
power challenges that burden communities seeking to intervene in siting 
processes and facilitate more efficient contracting around easements and rights-
of-way.  
The reconstituted PHMSA that Gosman imagines, with unified safety and 
siting authority, could provide landowners and local governments with 
information necessary to meaningfully incorporate safety concerns into 
easement negotiations. As Gosman articulately details, in the siting process 
safety is secondary to economic considerations surrounding markets.94 
However, were PHMSA to consider safety and siting together, the agency would 
have a more informed process and would approve only those pipelines that 
could be routed so as to prevent the most significant risks.95 A requirement to 
consider safety at the siting stage could encourage more robust analyses of 
safety risks as part of alternatives in NEPA review and evaluations. 
Transparency in this process would overcome some of the information 
asymmetry surrounding pipeline risk, thus empowering landowners and local 
governments to participate more meaningfully in siting proceedings.96  
PHMSA regulations could also address the lack of power experienced by 
many landowners and local governments by encouraging cooperation among 
landowners. The preemption of local regulation by state and federal law limits 
participation by communities to a consultative process, which is largely 
advisory and impedes bargaining power.97 Formal intervention in federal siting 
proceedings require early, coordinated action and access to counsel.98 These are 
 
raise initially. Id.; see also Mountain Valley Pipeline, L.L.C., 163 FERC ¶ 61,197, at 5–6 
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 92 Kalen, supra note 54 (manuscript at 34–37). 
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cost prohibitive to most individual landowners and communities.99 In a handful 
of rare scenarios, landowners along proposed pipeline routes are organizing 
themselves into coalitions to obtain greater concessions and power in 
negotiations, requiring pipeline companies to deal with them collectively rather 
than individually.100 These coalitions, most prevalently led by lawyers and 
landowners in rural areas with greater landowner homogeneity, recognize that 
risk and liability are tied to the terms of the easements they negotiate, and that 
spills and releases elsewhere along the route can have significant transboundary 
impacts on water and environmental resources.101 As Ellickson observed, 
members of close-knit groups leverage preexisting social relationships to reduce 
transaction costs among relatively homogenous landowners by sharing costs of 
information and representation.102 Landowners along a pipeline route recognize 
that cooperation may increase their bargaining position through collective action 
thus increasing cooperation.103 Not all landowners along a proposed route, 
however, realize the coordination benefits of organically formed, close-knit 
associations. Earlier coordination and attentiveness to processes such as open 
houses that bring together stakeholders and facilitate intervention will assure 
that local concerns are more substantively incorporated into siting processes.104 
PHMSA could help landowners overcome barriers to intervention by 
facilitating opportunities for communities to organize earlier through improved 
notice requirements. Stronger and earlier notice requirements could require an 
applicant for a FERC certificate to furnish landowners with detailed information 
about the federal intervention process and provide the names of other, adjacent 
landowners along the proposed pipeline route. These requirements already exist 
in some state condemnation processes. For instance, North Dakota, requires a 
condemnor to provide the names of at least ten other property owners whose 
property may be taken for the project.105 By helping landowners identify other 
 
 99 See generally Debra Cassens Weiss, Middle-Class Dilemma: Can’t Afford Lawyers, 
Can’t Qualify for Legal Aid, ABA J. (July 22, 2010), https://www.abajournal.com/ 
news/article/middle-class_dilemma_cant_afford_lawyers_cant_qualify_for_legal_aid 
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DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2019/oct/ 
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MONITOR (May 28, 2019), https://www.austinmonitor.com/stories/2019/05/landowners-
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owners similarly situated along the proposed route, notice can overcome 
information barriers and help landowners organize and coordinate intervention 
across heterogeneous groups. 
An expanded siting and safety agency could also encourage private 
governance around safety by requiring minimum requirements for easements 
obtained using condemnation. Industry custom and formal laws and regulations 
that require negotiation as part of formal public energy siting processes can 
facilitate contracting between landowners and project developers.106 These 
mechanisms provide a structure for parties to negotiate, rather than litigate, and 
create a space within which collaborative and site-specific solutions can be 
generated.107 The resulting agreements form an important component of 
environmental and risk governance. For instance, negotiated easements may 
specify restrictions on landowner uses overlying pipeline easements, address 
liability for spills, and impose requirements for pipeline abandonment and 
removal.108 Further, negotiations may identify synergistic or incompatible uses 
preemptively,109 facilitating the location of pipelines in areas that prevent future 
conflicts which could increase the risks of spills and releases. State laws impose 
minimum negotiation requirements for some energy facility siting,110 split 
estates,111 and condemnation proceedings.112 State public service commissions 
may also require landowner coordination around safety and environmental 
issues as a condition to the grant of a construction permit.113 In contrast, the 
Natural Gas Act does not mandate negotiation around these requirements, nor 
does it assess the fairness or adequacy of easement terms, even where access is 
obtained pursuant to a conditional certificate.114 By adopting minimum terms 
regarding safety, liability, and reclamation within condemned easements, FERC 
can expand opportunities for landowners to contract around safety issues. 
Finally, Gosman’s reconstituted PHMSA could provide local governments 
with shared responsibility over some aspects of siting, thus expanding the space 
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within which contract-based consent processes occur. Voluntary and self-
initiated cooperation is unlikely to overcome the significant lack of power and 
informational and transaction costs that communities face when intervening in 
federal siting process. For instance, cooperation is likely to be more difficult in 
more urban areas where many of the individuals significantly affected by the 
externalities associated with pipelines may not own land directly overlying the 
proposed route.115 Rules that allow cities and counties to regulate some aspects 
of pipeline siting would encourage negotiation and provide additional 
opportunities to resolve local safety concerns.116 Although multi-tenure 
processes may increase the initial cost and time of coordinating property 
interests along the pipeline,117 it could reduce subsequent litigation and public 
opposition.  
Decentralized governance and greater local authority within coordinated, 
multi-level siting processes may encourage innovative solutions, enhance 
accountability for local impacts, address social license, and provide space within 
which private ordering can occur.118 A number of contexts within energy 
governance already encourage shared governance and agency coordination.119 
For instance, Colorado’s Oil and Gas Conservation Act grants local 
governments the explicit power to regulate the surface impacts of oil and gas 
operations in a manner that “protect[s] and minimizes adverse impacts to public 
health, safety, and welfare and the environment.”120 The Colorado Oil and Gas 
Conservation Commission (COGCC) rules further allow operators to 
voluntarily streamline certain permitting processes for oil and gas development 
after a transparent and methodological process that includes multi-agency 
coordination between local governments, counties, and state environmental 
quality and wildlife agencies.121 In contrast to consultation requirements in 
FERC pre-filing and NEPA review processes,122 the COGCC rules explicitly 
authorize local governments to issue siting permits and participate in agency 
proceedings.123 Additionally, common law rules governing split estates and 
state statutes requiring accommodation of surface uses have contributed to 
strong norms of contract between landowners and energy developers.124 As a 
 
 115 See Riley W. Vanham, Comment, A Shift in Power: Why Increased Urban Drilling 
Necessitates a Change in Regulatory Authority, 43 ST. MARY’S L.J. 229, 247 (2011). 
 116 van de Biezenbos, supra note 55, at 335–41. 
 117 Leonard & Parker, supra note 38, at 41–42. 
 118 See supra notes 97–117 and accompanying text. 
 119 See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory 
Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1159–60 (2012). 
 120 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 29-20-104(1)(g)–(h), (2), (3) (2019).  
 121 See, e.g., COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, COGCC RULES & 
REGULATIONS 216, 305(a)–(f), 507, 509 (2020). 
 122 See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text. 
 123 COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, COGCC RULES & REGULATIONS 
216(d)(2), 503(b)(4) (2020). 
 124 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-127 (2019); Chase v. Colo. Oil. & Gas Conservation 
Comm’n, 2012 COA 94, ¶¶ 33–37, 284 P.3d 161, 167–68 (Colo. App. 2012).  
2020] OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE 77 
 
result, both landowners and local governments frequently negotiate the terms of 
development including local land use improvements and investments in public 
services.125 These agreements also provide local governments with contract 
remedies in the event of breach.126 An administrative process that requires 
negotiation with local governments prior to accessing land would also provide 
communities with additional opportunities for judicial review. Private law 
arrangements, such as surface use agreements with landowners and memoranda 
of understanding with local governments, are one facet of a democratized 
energy siting process in which community voices are more substantively 
weighed.127 
Strong state laws and procedural requirements around condemnation can 
assure meaningful judicial review of federal pipeline condemnation 
proceedings. Courts can shape the scope and tone of negotiations around 
pipeline siting and address intergovernmental authority conflicts. Currently, 
many communities and landowners face the prospect of David versus Goliath 
negotiations with pipeline developers who may already have a Section 7 
certificate, a conditional certificate, or a preliminary injunction granting access 
to land.128 Even where parties can agree on the terms of possession and scope 
of easements, judicial review may be limited to an assessment of fair market 
value.129 However, in recent years state courts have shown willingness to 
consider the reasonableness of offers made as part of eminent domain and 
compulsory pooling proceedings based on review of comparable agreements130 
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and the safety concerns of municipalities.131 These requirements may also apply 
to federal condemnation proceedings.132 The Natural Gas Act requires that the 
practice and procedure for federal condemnation proceedings conform “as 
nearly as may be” to that in state court proceedings.133 Accordingly, 
incorporating procedural consultation, good faith, and minimum contracting 
requirements into state eminent domain law and agency rules could provide 
municipalities with expanded opportunities for judicial review of the 
reasonableness of easement terms and development agreements. 
A cooperative framework—within which both local governments and 
federal authorities share aspects of siting responsibility—assures that local 
concerns will be addressed but that public-good projects move forward.134 
Formal negotiation requirements related to land use permits with administrative 
subdivisions, such as water or conservation districts, fire districts, county 
commissioners, or city councils, could facilitate bargaining over localized 
impacts, while retaining ultimate regulation of safety and siting with FERC. 
Greater involvement by local governments could provide pathways for them to 
share in the benefits of energy infrastructure projects and address the social 
costs135 and to raise concerns about safety and siting earlier within federal siting 
processes.136 Ultimate review by a higher-level agency such as FERC could 
assure that safety concerns were appropriately prioritized in coordinated multi-
agency siting processes and could mitigate potential downsides of a multi-level 
governance approach including consolidation of risk, holdouts, and 
environmental justice concerns.137 
As Gosman’s article convincingly illuminates, informed decision making 
around energy transportation infrastructure cannot happen in a segregated 
process: siting and safety are emmeshed.138 By reimagining pipelines as a 
landscape-scale resource, it also becomes apparent that pipeline safety is a 
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function of coupled human and natural systems: the safety, performance, and 
operation of pipelines are influenced by their location, the people who live and 
work in and around them, and the communities and ecosystems through which 
they pass.139 Despite this, the current pipeline siting framework treats pipelines 
as objects in insolation, focusing disproportionately on economic feasibility and 
relying on other regulatory mechanisms to control, manage, and remediate 
risk.140 Ever-growing information about public health, safety, and 
environmental consequences of pipeline accidents have better equipped 
communities, landowners, and regulators to collaboratively assemble the 
resource rights necessary for pipeline projects within a framework that includes 
safety and risk governance. 
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